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‘INDIVIDUALISM’ AND ‘COLLECTIVISM’ IN COLLECTIVE LABOUR LAW 
 
ALAN BOGG* 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This article examines the concepts of ‘individualism’ and ‘collectivism’ in collective labour 
law. A popular critique of freedom of association norms characterises such norms as 
‘individualist’ or ‘individualistic’. This individualist bias undermines the institutions of 
collective labour relations. The 'individualist' critique is often coupled with the development 
of an alternative positive account of collective labour law that is based upon a foundation of 
‘collectivism’. ‘Collectivist’ labour law encompasses a concern for collective or group rights, 
rather than rights for individuals; it affirms collective values; and the metric of legitimacy of 
a legal regime of freedom of association is the extent to which it supports collective 
bargaining through independent trade unions. On this conventional approach, ‘individualism’ 
and ‘collectivism’ stand in opposition to each other. This article argues against this 
dichotomous understanding of ‘individualism’ and ‘collectivism’. A comparative perspective 
on the ‘right to organize’ supports the view that individual and collective rights can stand in a 
complementary relation to each other. Furthermore, the union's right to exclude may 
sometimes legitimately yield to competing individual rights, such as the right not to be 
subjected to unjust discriminatory treatment. The important task for labour lawyers is to 
identify an effective combination of collective and individual rights in order to promote just 
and decent outcomes in the workplace. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Two of the most heavily used critical concepts in collective labour law are ‘individualism’ 
and ‘collectivism’.1 Often, ‘individualism’ is used to convey an adverse normative judgement 
when it is deployed in the labour law literature. In the hands of Lord Wedderburn and Bob 
Simpson particularly, ‘individualism’ and ‘collectivism’ can seem to be locked in a kind of 
zero-sum game for supremacy, with the decline of the norms and institutions of collective 
labour law corresponding to the rise of ‘individualism’. Yet for all their ubiquity, there has 
been surprisingly little systematic analysis in the labour law literature of what might be 
entailed by ‘individualism’ and ‘collectivism’ in the field of labour law. 
 
As a normative ideal in the history of politics, ‘individualism’ is a heterogeneous concept. 
Sometimes it has been used with negative connotations. Steven Lukes has suggested that, in 
historical terms, ‘individualism resides in dangerous ideas, for others it is social or economic 
anarchy, for yet others it is the prevalence of self-interested attitudes among individuals.’2 It 
should not be imagined that this ‘social cohesion’ critique of ‘individualism’ is a property 
exclusive either to right-wing or left-wing political thought. ‘Individualism’ was as likely to 
be used as a term of abuse by socialists committed to socialist cooperation in a productive 
commonwealth, as it was by conservatives concerned to preserve the authority of tradition 
and the existing social order. ‘Individualism’ was likewise the stirring call to arms of radicals 
committed to the overthrow of political and religious oppression, and the emancipation of 
citizens through liberal rights and democratic government.3 In short, ‘individualism’ and 
‘collectivism’ are terms shot through with conceptual and normative disagreement. Given this 
heterogeneity, there is significant value in pausing to reflect on their use in labour law. In so 
doing, we might sharpen our awareness of what is really at stake in categorising a legal right 
or policy as ‘individualist’. It also helps to avoid the term becoming mere shorthand to signal 
normative disapproval of a law or policy that we happen to dislike, detached from more 
precise analytical meanings. 
1 For some recent examples in the Industrial Law Journal, see A. L. Bogg, ‘Employment 
Relations Act 2004: Another False Dawn for Collectivism?’ (2005) 34 ILJ 72 and B. 
Creighton, ‘A Retreat from Individualism? The Fair Work Act 2009 and the Re-
collectivisation of Australian Labour Law’ (2011) 40 ILJ 116. 
2 S. Lukes, Individualism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1973) 9. 
3 For a full discussion of this heterogeneity in historical perspective, see Lukes, ibid 3-39. 
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This article offers a modest contribution to that clarificatory task, and it is a task that is vitally 
important. I argue that the categorisation of legal rights as ‘individualist’ is prone to 
interpretive difficulties, for such categorisations are usually more complex than a single 
descriptive label is able to convey. Rights may be ‘individualist’ in respect of the right-
holder; or they may be ‘individualist’ in terms of standing to enforce the right; or they may be 
‘individualist’ in respect of the remedies available to repair infringements of the right; or they 
may be ‘individualist’ in terms of their purpose and social effects. Furthermore, the sphere of 
trade union autonomy and the trade union’s right to regulate its own membership criteria is 
testament to the complexity of the interactions between ‘individualism’ and ‘collectivism’. 
Some forms of ‘individualism’, such as those concerned to protect individuals from unjust 
discrimination by social groups, are morally compelling. The thread that runs through the 
arguments to follow is that it is better to develop a coherent structure of individual and 
collective rights that lead to just social and economic outcomes in the sphere of work. This 
should lead us to elevate questions of substance over questions of form in the design of legal 
regulation, to be attentive to what works in promoting social justice. 
 
Before proceeding, it important to place my normative cards face up on the table. It is my 
belief that there is an important sense in which all labour lawyers should embrace 
‘individualism’. As we shall see, some ‘collectivist’ labour lawyers, such as Bob Simpson, 
have issued a passionate plea to position ‘values of collectivism’ at the moral centre of 
collective labour law.4 We should be cautious, I think, before accepting the call to endorse 
‘values of collectivism’ as the foundation of collective labour rights. The first reason for 
caution is the powerful appeal of the ‘humanistic principle’ in normative philosophy. The 
‘humanistic principle’ holds that ‘it is individual well-being that is of “ultimate concern”.’5 
There are various formulations of this principle. For example, Finnis renders this principle in 
terms of the ‘priority of persons’ in normative ethics and the organisation of political and 
legal arrangements.6 This establishes a basic moral plateau for the acceptability of legal and 
political theories. It also has important implications for our understanding of associations and 
4 B. Simpson, ‘Freedom of Association and the Right to Organize: The Failure of an 
Individual Rights Strategy’ (1995) 24 ILJ 235, 251. 
5 See D. Newman, Community and Collective Rights (Oxford: Hart, 2011) 12, citing J. Raz, 
The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: OUP, 1986) 194. 
6 J. Finnis, ‘The Priority of Persons’, in J. Horder (ed), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence: 
Fourth Series (Oxford: OUP, 2000) 1. 
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their relationships with individual well-being. Ultimately, the value of an association stands 
or falls in its contribution to the well-being of individual persons. According to Langille, for 
example, the ‘primal aspiration’ of collective activity is ‘the good of the worker as an 
individual human being’.7 In his work on collective rights, Newman has argued that what he 
describes as the ‘service principle’ is entailed by the ‘humanistic principle’; the ‘service 
principle’ holds that associations must serves the well-being interests of individual members 
of the group.8 This would exclude some highly corporatist or authoritarian accounts of social 
groups and their relation with individual members.9 If proponents of ‘collectivism’ do deny 
that individual well-being is of ultimate concern, then we should insist that its protagonists 
present their alternative account of what is of ‘ultimate concern’. If not the good of individual 
persons, then what else? 
 
The second reason is that the call for ‘values of collectivism’ may betray an assumption that 
only ‘collective values’ can provide a normative foundation for collective rights. Given that I 
shall argue that collective rights are an essential element in a decent structure of collective 
labour law, does this not require me to join with Simpson in endorsing ‘values of 
collectivism’ as the foundation of the discipline? Such a move rests upon a flawed 
assumption, I would suggest, which is that the ‘humanistic principle’ can only provide a 
normative grounding for individual rights. There are some scholars who take that view, 
arguing that the fundamental components of freedom of association must consist of 
individual rights, but this assumption is based upon faulty thinking.10 It is perfectly possible 
to develop a theory of collective rights that satisfies the constraints of the ‘humanistic 
principle’.11 Indeed, most plausible theoretical accounts of group rights are consistent with 
the requirements of the ‘humanistic principle’, grounding those rights in their contribution to 
individual well-being.12 In this way, we can be individualists on matters of ultimate value 
7 B. Langille, ‘The Freedom of Association Mess: How We Got into It and How We Can Get 
Out of It’ (2009) 54 McGill Law Journal 177, 188. 
8 Newman n.5 at chapter 5. 
9 See, for example, R. Scruton, ‘Corporate Persons’ (1989) 63 Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society Supp 239, and for a critique that would be sympathetic to the ‘humanistic principle’, 
see J. Finnis, ‘Persons and their Associations’ in J. Finnis, Intention & Identity Collected 
Essays: Volume II (Oxford: OUP, 2011) 92. 
10 Langille, n.7 at 186. 
11 For an admirable example, see Newman n.5. 
12 See A. Bogg and K.D. Ewing, ‘A (Muted) Voice at Work? Collective Bargaining in the 
Supreme Court of Canada’ (2011-2012) 33 Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal 379, 
401-408. 
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while providing a compelling normative justification for collective rights in the legal regime 
protecting freedom of association. 
 
Finally, it is important to be precise about the wider political and economic contexts to the 
uses of ‘individualism’. As Steven Lukes has demonstrated, ‘individualism’ displays 
heterogeneity in its various guises in political, social and economic theory. Economic 
individualism postulates the ‘unfettered self-interest of individuals’ as a methodological and a 
normative anchor.13 It found its strongest modern articulation in the works of Hayek and 
Friedman in the defence of laissez-faire liberalism and the minimal state.14 Political 
individualism rests upon a concept of citizenship as a status of ‘independent and rational 
beings, who are the sole generators of their own wants and preferences, and the best judges of 
their own interests’.15  
 
Political individualism could be said to  rest upon a theory of ‘asocial individualism’, with the 
individual treated as severable from social needs, values and attachments.16 This is 
sometimes connected to political concerns about the erosion of community through the 
assertion of rights claims.17 It also underlies communitarian concerns about the erosion of 
social solidarity by human rights discourse.18 I suspect that when many labour lawyers are 
taking aim at ‘individualism’, it is these targets that the critics have in mind. These economic 
and political theories of individualism might be described as ‘abstract individualism’, in the 
abstraction of the individual from her social commitments and attachments.19 Other forms of 
‘individualism’ have very different normative implications. For example, Lukes has defended 
a concept of ‘individualism’ based in ‘un-abstracted individuals in their concrete, social 
specificity, who, in virtue of being persons, all require to be treated and to live in a social 
order which treats them as possessing dignity, as capable of exercising and increasing their 
autonomy, of engaging in valued activities within a private space, and of developing their 
13 Lukes, n.2 at 89. 
14 Ibid., 92-93. 
15 Ibid., 79. 
16 On the idea of ‘asocial individualism’ in liberal theories, see S. Mulhall and A. Swift, 
Liberals and Communitarians (Oxford: Blackwell, 2nd ed 1996) 13-18. 
17 S. Avineri and A. de-Shalit, ‘Introduction’ in S. Avineri and A. de-Shalit (eds), 
Communitarianism and Individualism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992) 4-5. 
18 M.A. Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse (New York: The 
Free Press, 1993). 
19 Lukes n.2 at 152. 
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several potentialities’.20 If this is what ‘individualism’ is taken to mean, then ‘collectivists’ in 
labour law have every reason to endorse it. 
 
The argument is structured in the following way. Section 2 sets out the historical 
development of ‘individualism’ in labour law, charting its use in the work of Otto Kahn-
Freund, Lord Wedderburn and Bob Simpson. While each of these scholars can be understood 
as working within the broad tradition of collective laissez-faire, there were significant 
differences between them on the meaning and import of ‘individualism’. In Bob Simpson’s 
work, the concept of ‘individualism’ is deployed as a systematic critique of British labour law 
on the ‘right to organize’ and the legal regulation of trade union autonomy. Simpson’s work 
on freedom of association marks the highpoint of the ‘individualist’ critique in collective 
laissez-faire.  
 
In section 3, the different permutations of ‘individualism’ in the ‘right to organize’ are 
examined, drawing upon comparative material. This comparative analysis demonstrates that 
‘individualism’ and ‘collectivism’ are in fact rather complex terms, and it questions the 
usefulness of criticising a given right as ‘individualist’ without further elaboration and 
precision. Some individual rights, such as the right not to be victimised for trade union 
membership or activities, provide a crucial underpinning to the ‘right to organize’. 
Furthermore, elements of the ‘individual’ and ‘collective’ can be blended in different ways 
across a range of axes: we might be concerned with protecting collective right-holders by 
conferring freestanding group rights; or we might grant rights of standing to trade unions to 
enforce individual rights on behalf of the primary right-holder; or we might incorporate the 
‘collective’ into the range of remedies available where an individual trade unionist is 
victimised to compensate the trade union itself for its own associated losses. In short, we 
might say that rights could have strongly individual features without thereby being 
individualistic. For example, the individual right to strike, correlative to a doctrine of 
contractual suspension and strong unfair dismissal protection, is an individual right that 
provides a critical legal underpinning to the operation of collective labour relations. It is 
individual but not individualistic. By contrast, the right to refuse to participate in lawful strike 
20 Ibid., 153. 
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action is an individual right whose purposes and social effects on collective labour relations 
could properly be described as individualistic.21 
 
In section 4, the ‘individualist’ critique of the legal regulation of trade union autonomy is 
examined. Various problems with the ‘individualism’/’collectivism’ distinction are identified. 
These problems may be regarded as undermining the utility of the ‘individualist’ critique. 
Some individual rights, such as the right to exit a trade union, provide a strong foundation for 
the trade union to assert its autonomy against state regulation. Other individual rights, such as 
the right not to be subjected to unjust discrimination, should take priority over collective 
autonomy. In other words, some forms of ‘individualism’ are morally appropriate, and some 
forms of ‘collectivism’ are morally suspect.  
 
2.    THE GENEALOGY OF ‘INDIVIDUALISM’ IN BRITISH LABOUR LAW 
 
In this section, I examine the historical development of ‘individualism’ in the work of Otto 
Kahn-Freund, Lord Wedderburn and Bob Simpson. Each of them may be understood to have 
adhered broadly to the principles of ‘collective laissez-faire’, using it is a normative 
framework for the elaboration and critical analysis of labour law. Yet there were significant 
variations in the normative implications of ‘individualism’ between these three scholars. In 
Kahn-Freund’s work, ‘the individualist tradition’ was endorsed as a valuable aspect of the 
common law tradition in protecting the freedom of the individual worker. By contrast, Lord 
Wedderburn’s engagement with individualism, especially in his work in the late 1980s on 
freedom of association, marked a significant turn in its critical usage. Lord Wedderburn 
deployed ‘individualism’ both as a critique of human rights law under Article 11 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and as a more general critique of patterns 
of common law adjudication on freedom of association. Finally, Bob Simpson provided the 
most developed account of ‘collectivism’ and ‘individualism’ as critical concepts in the 
development of British labour law as it related to freedom of association. We find here the 
most decisive normative repudiation of ‘individualism’ as a principle of collective labour 
law, and a particularly strong contrast with the role of ‘individualism’ in the work of Kahn-
Freund. 
 
21 I am grateful to Mark Freedland for pressing me on this distinction. 
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A. Otto Kahn-Freund and ‘the individualist tradition’ 
 
The final section of Kahn-Freund’s seminal essay published in 1959, ‘Labour Law’, is 
focused on ‘the individualist tradition’ in British labour law.22 This section on individualism 
is perhaps less well-known than other parts of the essay, such as his formulation of the 
principle of ‘collective laissez-faire’ and the tradition of ‘legal non-intervention’.23 Indeed, its 
content provides something of a jolt to the contemporary student of British labour law, given 
the negative connotations of ‘individualism’ in contemporary labour law. This starting 
assumption may lead us to expect a thoroughgoing critique of the regressive tendencies of the 
English common law in collective labour relations, and the reactionary quality of that section 
of ‘public opinion’ formed by the English legal profession. Instead, Kahn-Freund provides a 
careful elaboration of the ‘individualist tradition’ that provides a cautious yet unmistakeably 
positive normative evaluation. There are two dimensions to Kahn-Freund’s elucidation of the 
‘individualist tradition’. First, he provides a normative appraisal of the principle of ‘freedom 
of contract’ in the English common law. Second, this is linked to a justification for the 
intervention of the common law to restrain abuses of power by trade unions against 
individual trade unionists. In this way, the ‘individualist tradition’ is not regarded by Kahn-
Freund as antithetical to the rules and practices of collective labour relations. On the contrary, 
it provided an indispensable part of the system of collective laissez-faire. 
 
The first principle of ‘the individualist tradition’ was the deep aversion of the English 
common law to any form of legal compulsion in the individual contract of employment, and 
‘the refusal to have even a vestige of compulsory labour in peacetime’.24 In this respect, 
Kahn-Freund had been evidently moved by the speech of Lord Atkin in Nokes v Doncaster 
Amalgamated Collieries where Lord Atkin had stood against the transfer of contracts of 
employment in an amalgamation of companies: ‘I had fancied that ingrained in the personal 
status of a citizen under our laws was the right to choose for himself whom he would serve, 
22 O. Kahn-Freund, ‘Labour Law’, reprinted in O. Kahn-Freund, Selected Writings (London: 
Stevens & Sons, 1978) 1, reprinted from M. Ginsberg (ed), Law and Opinion in England in 
the 20th Century (London: Stevens & Sons, 1959), 215. 
23 Ibid., at 31. 
24 Ibid. 
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and this right of choice constituted the main difference between a servant and a serf.’25 
Certainly, Kahn-Freund was astute to the various ways in which this principle of freedom of 
contract had been eroded. In this respect, he noted the wartime measures of Essential Work 
Orders and the scheme of compulsory arbitration introduced in Order 1305 that criminalised 
striking; the operation of the Dock Labour Scheme; and the range of state steering 
mechanisms to promote employment and labour mobility. Nevertheless, most of these 
measures were to be regarded as exceptional, agreed by both sides of industry during periods 
of national peril. Moreover, these measures were legislative or governmental in origin. In 
‘Labour Law’, Kahn-Freund seemed to regard the common law as providing a libertarian 
backstop that protected ‘the power to decide whether or not to enter into or to terminate the 
employment relationship.’26 
  
The second principle of ‘the individualist tradition’ was ‘the protection of the individual 
against superior social forces’ and the increased willingness of courts ‘to protect minorities 
inside trade unions’.27 For Kahn-Freund, the intervention of the common law in the internal 
affairs of trade unions is described as ‘an almost necessary corollary of the growing policy of 
non-interference with labour-management relations, and especially with the operation of 100 
percent union and closed-shop practices’.28 The trade unions’ power of interference in the 
‘right to work’ of workers, facilitated by the law’s toleration of closed shop practices, meant 
that it was necessary for the courts to ‘prevent unions from misusing through wrongful 
expulsion their power of industrial ostracism’.29 It is perhaps also surprising to see Kahn-
Freund refer approvingly to Lord Denning’s judgment in Lee v Showmen’s Guild of Great 
Britain.30 In ‘Labour Law’, Kahn-Freund was focused on the common law’s restraint of 
‘arbitrary’ expulsions from trade union membership, and he observed that the courts ‘cannot 
25 Ibid., at 32, citing Lord Atkin in Nokes v Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries [1940] AC 
1014. Kahn-Freund also noted Lord Atkin’s dissent in Liversidge v Anderson [1942] AC 206 
and his role ‘as one of the champions of civil liberties in our time’. 
26 Kahn-Freund n.22, at 31. Kahn-Freund’s views on ‘freedom of contract’ developed 
significantly over his career, and in his later work Kahn-Freund adopted a somewhat more 
troubled attitude towards the emancipatory potential of the common law. For a subtle and 
sensitive discussion of this development, see M. Freedland, ‘Otto Kahn-Freund, the Contract 
of Employment and the Autonomy of Labour Law’, in A. Bogg, C. Costello, A.C.L. Davies 
and J. Prassl (eds), The Autonomy of Labour Law (Oxford: Hart, 2015), 29. 
27 Kahn-Freund, n.22 at 36. 
28 Ibid., 37. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid., at 37, citing Lee v Showmen’s Guild of Great Britain [1952] 2 QB 329. 
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control admissions’.31 In retrospect, that statement is rather too categorical, as Lord 
Denning’s later judgment in Nagle v Fielden was to demonstrate.32 Furthermore, Kahn-
Freund’s strictures against judicial control over admission were supported by his view that 
there is not ‘in a very homogeneous society, much need for doing so.’33 This contrasted with 
the United States, where the emergence of a ‘duty of fair representation’ was a necessary 
counterpart of exclusive bargaining representation in a racially divided society.34 It was 
obviously implicit in Kahn-Freund’s position that if British society became more 
heterogeneous, the normative arguments in favour of a more assertive ‘individualist tradition’ 
would be strengthened. 
 
It is a surprising fact, therefore, given the subsequent development of ‘individualism’ in the 
scholarly literature, that in Kahn-Freund’s own estimation of collective laissez-faire, 
‘individualism’ was a virtue of the British industrial relations system, not a threat to it. 
Indeed, the ‘individualist tradition’ was an occasion for praise of the English common law, 
rather than a critical attack on the regressiveness of the English judiciary.35 It is also 
important to view the two dimensions of ‘the individualist tradition’ as linked elements. 
Kahn-Freund was equally condemnatory of ‘the futility of attempts to make people work or 
employ under threats of committal and attachment’.36 In other words, the principle of 
freedom of contract was symmetrical, encompassing both the freedom to enter the 
relationship and the freedom to terminate it, for both parties.37 This provided an argument 
against restrictions on the dismissal powers of the employer. Although this is left obscured in 
Kahn-Freund’s analysis, this strong attachment to freedom of contract in fact provided the 
legal underpinning to prevalent union closed-shop practices. While this state of affairs 
provided a strong social underpinning to trade unions’ ‘right to organize’, it simultaneously 
justified an interventionist role for the courts in protecting the individual from arbitrary or 
unjust disciplinary practices by trade unions in closed shop arrangements. In other words, the 
31 Ibid. 
32 [1966] 2 QB 633. 
33 Kahn-Freund, n. 22, at 37. 
34 P. Davies and M. Freedland (eds), Kahn-Freund’s Labour and the Law (London: Stevens 
& Sons, 3rd ed 1983), 91. 
35 This may reflect deeper divergences between scholars such as Kahn-Freund and 
Wedderburn in their attitudes towards the English common law as a body of norms. For 
discussion, see A. Bogg, ‘The Hero’s Journey: Lord Wedderburn and the “Political 
Constitution” of Labour Law’ (2015) 44 ILJ 299, 314-315. 
36 Kahn-Freund, n. 22 at 34. 
37 Ibid., 31. 
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common law’s strong protection of individuals against trade union abuses was the necessary 
counterpart of a highly collectivist collective bargaining regime. It should nevertheless be 
remembered that these arguments were being crafted in 1959, when the virtues of ‘industrial 
autonomy’ were at their height, and the social strength of trade unions taken as a political 
given. This concern with individual freedom was also developing in a wider intellectual 
context where ideas in political philosophy were no doubt being shaped by the prospect of 
totalitarianism as a credible threat to liberal institutions.38 In later years, when collective 
laissez-faire faced profound and existential challenges, scholars would begin to reappraise the 
ways in which ‘individualism’ might be used to attack collective labour relations.39 
 
B. Lord Wedderburn: Individualism and Human Rights 
 
A significant shift in the ideological resonance of ‘individualism’ occurred during the 1980s, 
and this had implications for its use as a critical concept in labour law scholarship. That shift 
was reflected most strongly in Lord Wedderburn’s work on freedom of association, in 
particular his seminal piece ‘Freedom of Association or Right to Organise? The Common 
Law and International Sources’.40 The piece provides a subtle and comprehensive analysis of 
freedom of association in international, European and Commonwealth law, with a specific 
focus on the development of trade union rights under Article 11 of the ECHR. It may be read 
as a contribution to the constitutional debates at that time surrounding ‘incorporation’ of the 
ECHR into domestic law, and it provided a salutary warning about the constitutional 
empowerment of the English judiciary in the face of a vague and open-textured textual 
formula in Article 11. Yet its principal target is the judicial treatment of freedom of 
association by the European Court of Human Rights, and it is here that the analytical contrast 
between ‘individualism’ and ‘collectivism’ is deployed most forcefully. 
38 Isaiah Berlin delivered his famous inaugural lecture in Oxford in 1958, entitled ‘Two 
Concepts of Liberty’, which would later form the basis of his signature work, Four Essays on 
Liberty (Oxford: OUP, 1969). I am grateful to Tonia Novitz for pointing me to this most 
interesting parallel. 
39 ‘Labour Law’ was reprinted in a volume Selected Writings published in 1978, to honour 
Kahn-Freund’s contribution to The Modern Law Review. In his ‘Note’ to ‘Labour Law’ (n.22 
at 39-40), Kahn-Freund acknowledged the profound changes in law and society that had 
occurred between 1959 and 1978, and he noted the growth of statutory rights during the 
‘social contract’ period – many of them ‘individual’ in form – that supported trade union 
activities in the workplace. 
40 Lord Wedderburn, Employment Rights in Britain and Europe (London: Lawrence & 
Wishart, 1991), 138, originally published in (1987) 18 Industrial Relations Journal 244. 
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According to Wedderburn, Article 11 was ‘a sham formula’, based upon an ‘attenuated 
interpretation’ of the constituents of freedom of association, which was a ‘false prospectus’ 
for workers and trade unions.41 This scathing assessment is based upon the ‘individualistic’ 
theory of freedom of association that shaped the jurisprudence under Article 11. This 
‘individualism’ was reflected in three specific features of Article 11 jurisprudence. First, 
freedom of association was framed as a civil and political right such that ‘whereas the 
provisions in such conventions as the ECHR were couched largely in terms of individual 
rights, the ILO conventions are also with the elaboration of collective rights’.42 Consequently, 
individualism emerges as a critique of juridical form, and specifically the identity of the 
right-holder under the relevant instrument. Since the ECHR is based upon rights for 
individuals, rather than collective rights for groups such as the trade union itself, it is 
insufficient to provide an underpinning for collective labour relations. While Wedderburn 
acknowledges that ‘the duality would not matter so much if the mechanisms for the 
enforcement of the ECHR’ and other more collective instruments such as the ILO or the 
European Social Charter were equivalent, in practice they were not.43 This remedial 
asymmetry had the effect of privileging the individualist conception of freedom of 
association at the international level.  
 
Second, this individualism was reflected in the content of freedom of association in many 
constitutional fora. The ECtHR and a variety of constitutional courts in the commonwealth 
favoured a judicial interpretation of freedom of association that had ‘very little collective 
content at all’.44 In particular, the collective rights to organise, to bargain collectively, and to 
strike, were treated as extraneous to the constitutional protection of freedom of association, 
the effect of which was to distil a ‘grim reduction of freedom of association to the right to 
associate together for some purpose or other, however restricted’.45 By contrast, protecting 
the rights to organise, to bargain collectively and to strike through freedom of association 
would mean that ‘protection…for collective purposes’ was ‘built’ into the individual 
freedom.46 Finally, individualism was reflected in the strong judicial protection of the 
41 Ibid., 150. 
42 Ibid., 141. 
43 Ibid., 143. 
44 Ibid., 144. 
45 Ibid., 146. 
46 Ibid., 147. 
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negative right to disassociate, particularly under the ECHR.47 This ‘formalistic’ approach to 
negative freedom of association meant that human rights litigation provided a mechanism for 
dissentients to destabilise union security arrangements.48 It reflected the fact that ‘the 
function of conventions like the ECHR is largely to protect rights as they inhere in the 
individual’.49 The effect of this was that incorporation of Article 11 into domestic law might 
simply provide ‘yet another avenue for individuals to litigate against trade unions’,50 rather 
than operating as a powerful political instrument to promote collective interests. 
 
Wedderburn’s elaboration of ‘individualism’ marked a significant departure from Kahn-
Freund’s earlier work on the ‘individualist tradition’. Five aspects warrant particular 
emphasis. First, individualism is now being deployed as a critique of legal form, whereas in 
1959 the light legal structure of collective labour law rendered this analytical focus less apt. 
More specifically, in Wedderburn’s work it is being used to critique the structure and content 
of the right to freedom of association. This ‘human rights’ conception of freedom of 
association envisages an individual right-holder, and its content is detached from collective 
activities such as collective bargaining or union organisation. Second, Wedderburn identifies 
individualism as a threat to collective structures, in empowering dissentient individuals to 
obstruct the collective will of the trade union. By contrast, Kahn-Freund was more concerned 
with regulating and restraining abuse of power by collectivities such as trade unions against 
individuals. In other words, for Kahn-Freund there was an inverse proportionality between 
the organisational strength of trade unions and their permitted autonomy to organise their 
own internal affairs vis-à-vis trade union members. Wedderburn was more amenable to a 
situation where the collective strength and internal autonomy of trade unions is accorded 
maximal latitude by the legal framework.  
 
Third, Wedderburn’s work evinces a distrust and scepticism of the common law as an 
individualist body of norms, whereas for Kahn-Freund ‘the individualist tradition’ was a 
valuable dimension of the common law’s heritage. Wedderburn traced the ways in which 
judicial development of freedom of association in common law jurisdictions as diverse as 
47 Wedderburn’s particular focus is on Young, James and Webster v United Kingdom [1982] 
3 EHRR 38. 
48 Wedderburn links ‘formalism’ and ‘individualism’: ibid., at 144. 
49 Ibid., 142. 
50 Ibid., 150. 
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Canada, India and Trinidad displayed individualistic tendencies.51 By contrast, constitutional 
courts operating in European social democratic systems had adopted more collectivist 
interpretations of freedom of association. Fourth, Wedderburn’s intervention was emblematic 
of a strong strand of human rights-scepticism in British collective labour law scholarship in 
the late decades of the twentieth century. This was based upon a deeper set of reservations 
that this would entail an expanded role for the judiciary in developing labour law norms, and 
that human rights discourse was irredeemably individualistic in its normative foundations and 
social impact. Finally, Wedderburn was ultimately rather nuanced on the issue of the 
interaction between ‘individualism’ and ‘collectivism’: ‘just as the collective freedom cannot 
function without the individual freedom, so the latter, where trade unions and protection of 
interests are concerned, is meaningless without the former’.52 There is no blithe elevation of 
the ‘collective’ over the ‘individual’. Rather, the individual and collective dimensions of 
freedom of association are, in the end, complementary and mutually reinforcing. For 
Wedderburn, it was impossible to have one without the other. 
 
C. Individualism and Collectivism in the work of Bob Simpson 
 
The distinction between ‘individualism’ and ‘collectivism’ as an analytical framework is 
developed most fully in Bob Simpson’s work on freedom of association during the 1990s. 
Two pieces stand out as exemplars of this analytical approach. The first piece, ‘Freedom of 
Association and the Right to Organize: The Failure of an Individual Rights Strategy’, was 
explicitly indebted to Wedderburn’s earlier work on freedom of association.53 It was 
prompted by the decision of the House of Lords in Wilson and Palmer, where a majority of 
the House of Lords concluded that the withholding of pay rises in order to disestablish 
collective bargaining arrangements was not ‘action short of dismissal’ on the grounds of 
‘membership’ of an independent trade union.54 It developed a powerful critique of the legal 
framework of the ‘right to organize’ in British labour law as a highly individualist body of 
law that was unsuited to promoting joint regulation through collective bargaining. The second 
piece, ‘Individualism versus Collectivism: An Evaluation of section 14 of the Trade Union 
51 Ibid., 145-149. 
52 Ibid., 142-143. 
53 B. Simpson, ‘Freedom of Association and the Right to Organize: The Failure of an 
Individual Rights Strategy’ (1995) 24 ILJ 235. 
54 Associated Newspapers Ltd v Wilson and Associated British Ports v Palmer [1995] ICR 
406. 
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Reform and Employment Rights Act 1993’, analysed and critiqued the other dimension of 
freedom of association concerned with trade union autonomy and the legal regulation of 
internal trade union affairs.55 Specifically, it was concerned with the new ‘right’ introduced 
in section 174 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 
(TULRCA) for an individual to choose which union to join, and it speculated on the impact 
of this new individual right on the voluntary regulation of inter-union competition by the 
Trades Union Congress (TUC) dispute resolution procedures. Taken together, these pieces 
provided a systematic critique of ‘individualist’ freedom of association in British labour law. 
 
Beginning with ‘Freedom of Association and the Right to Organize’, this piece developed 
and deepened Wedderburn’s individualist critique of Article 11. Simpson’s critical analysis 
was concerned with domestic law, however. It appraised the legal strategy in the ‘social 
contract’ period to construct ‘a collective “right to associate” out of the bricks of certain 
“individual” employment rights’.56 This legal structure consisted of a code of individual 
rights protecting employees from victimisation and dismissal on the grounds of trade union 
membership and trade union activities at an appropriate time, alongside positive 
organisational supports such as the individual right to paid time off for trade union officials. 
According to Simpson, judgments such as Wilson and Palmer represented the culmination of 
a failed strategy based upon a statutory structure of individual rights for workers, rather than 
freestanding collective rights for trade unions. This legal structure was hobbled by formal and 
individualistic interpretations of core statutory concepts in the hands of a judiciary that was 
obtuse to the collective dimensions of trade union freedom. In this respect, Simpson favoured 
Wedderburn’s hostility towards the individualism of the English common law over Kahn-
Freund’s more positive assessment. 
 
It was therefore necessary to adopt an alternative ‘collective rights’ strategy that would give 
the union itself a legal right of redress in situations such as Carrington v Therm-A-Stor.57 
Thus, where the employer engaged in retaliatory action against employees by selecting them 
for redundancy in response to the trade union’s recognition claim, the trade union should be 
able to pursue its own remedies in that situation. This would reflect the fact that the trade 
55 (1993) 22 ILJ 181. 
56 Lord Wedderburn, ‘The Employment Protection Act 1975: Collective Aspects’ (1976) 39 
MLR 168, 169. 
57 [1983] ICR 208 (CA). 
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union itself suffered its own collective harms where its organisational activities were impeded 
by acts of victimisation against individual employees. In Carrington, it may be recalled, the 
Court of Appeal had concluded that since the acts of victimisation were not attributable to 
anything the victimised individuals had done personally, they had not been victimised on 
account of their own trade union activities. Consequently, neither the dismissed employees 
nor the trade union itself had any form of legal redress. Simpson also argued in favour of a 
collective right for the trade union to protect its own interests in Wilson and Palmer 
situations, where employers used financial inducements to undermine collective agreements. 
 
It would fail to do justice to the richness of Simpson’s argument to suggest that it was simply 
an application of Wedderburn’s earlier ideas on ‘individualism’. In fact, Simpson provides a 
nuanced and multi-layered perspective on the various axes of individualism within a structure 
of labour rights. First, individualism may be concerned with the identity of the right-holder. 
Thus, one of Simpson’s concerns with the Carrington lacuna is the absence of a legal right 
vested in the trade union itself. Second, individualism may relate to the substantive content of 
the right. Thus, Simpson is justifiably critical of judicial interpretations that eschew a 
‘purposive’ approach which leads ‘to the construction of individual rights which excludes any 
possible collective dimension’.58 A striking example of this is the judicial interpretation by 
Lord Bridge and Lord Lloyd in Wilson and Palmer of ‘membership’ as excluding the 
collective dimension of trade union services and facilities, such as collective bargaining.59 It 
represented a pattern of jurisprudence where the judicial approach is ‘to separate the 
individual from the collective for the purposes of interpretation and application of the law.’60  
 
Third, individualism might describe the remedies associated with a rights-violation. Thus, 
one of Simpson’s major criticisms of the ‘individual rights’ strategy is the absence of 
effective collective remedies where trade unions themselves experience losses that are 
separate from the losses of individuals. In support of this perspective on remedies, he cited 
the pertinent observations of Sir John Donaldson in Shipside (Ruthin) Ltd v TGWU where it 
was recognised that the dismissal of an individual trade union activist could be ‘a blow aimed 
at the union itself, particularly in the case of the dismissal of a union official.’61 This 
58 Simpson, n.53  at 244. 
59 Discussed by Simpson, ibid, 243. 
60 Ibid., 247. 
61 [1973] ICR 503, 506. 
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collective loss (of institutional security and prestige; of organisational strength and worker 
support; of recognition by the employer) could not be rectified by an award of compensation 
to the individual. Fourth, Simpson is concerned to identify the social effects of legal rights on 
industrial relations practices. This chimed with his concern for a ‘law in context’ approach,62 
assessing the law-in-practice rather than the law-in-the-books. For Simpson, the proper 
metric for this empirical assessment was the extent to which legal rights support or 
undermine joint regulation through collective bargaining. Finally, he specifies the importance 
of basing a new legal strategy on ‘the values of collectivism’.63 This indicates a concern for 
the underlying normative foundations of rights, and a clear preference for collectivist values. 
Suffice it to say that Simpson does not elaborate on what the ‘values of collectivism’ 
consisted in; or how they differed from the values of individualism; and what the relationship 
between these values and the specific form of a legal strategy might be. I have already cast 
doubt on this feature of Simpson’s work in the introduction’s endorsement of the ‘humanistic 
principle’. 
 
This multi-layered approach to individualism, operating across a range of possible axes, 
provided a powerful analytical tool for analysing labour rights. In particular, it provided a 
way of avoiding crude reductionism in the use of individualism as an analytical device. For, 
on Simpson’s approach, to characterise a labour right as ‘individualist’ is to invite a series of 
further and more discriminating questions about which aspect of the right is being so 
described: the right-holder? The substantive content of the right? Its associated remedies? It 
also opened up the possibility that labour rights regimes might blend different component 
‘individual’ and ‘collective’ elements in complex ways. For example, it might be possible to 
guarantee rights for individuals, enforceable either by the individual or their trade union, and 
giving rise to a range of individual and collective remedies for breach. Such a right would be 
both individual and collective. In the end, Simpson might assert that the important question 
was whether the blend of elements generated a right that worked in supporting joint 
regulation. 
 
For all its analytical openness, it is nevertheless possible to detect a harder normative line in 
Simpson’s work when compared with the work of Wedderburn’s upon which Simpson 
builds. It should be recalled that Wedderburn regarded individual and collective freedoms as 
62 B. Simpson, ‘The Changing Face of British Collective Labour Law’ (2001) 21 OJLS 705. 
63 Simpson , n.53 at 251. 
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existing in a complementary relation. At points, Simpson seems rather impatient with 
‘individual rights’ as a legal strategy for implementing the right to organize. Thus, Simpson 
argued that ‘any serious legislative strategy in support of the joint regulation of working life 
needs to focus on collective rather than individual rights’.64  Elsewhere, his approach is more 
restrained. So in arguing for a collective right in Carrington situations, this is proposed ‘in 
addition to adequate protection for individual workers’.65 He also acknowledges the practical 
utility of certain individual rights such as the right to paid time off for union officials, which 
contributed to an increase in shop stewards in the workplace and so strong workplace 
organisation.66 Nevertheless, Simpson’s patience with ‘individual rights’ seems rather more 
fragile than that displayed in Wedderburn’s earlier work on individualism in freedom of 
association. 
 
The second piece, concerned with trade union autonomy, is rather more explicit in 
postulating a conflict between individualism and collectivism in the sphere of freedom of 
association, and this is reflected in the article’s title ‘Individualism versus Collectivism’. The 
article examines the statutory right inserted into section 174 of TULRCA 1992, the effect of 
which was to subject trade union admissions and expulsions to an unprecedented level of 
state control. Specifically, an individual could only be excluded or expelled from trade union 
membership in circumstances permitted by the legislation. Controversially, it was not a 
permitted ground of exclusion or expulsion where an individual had refused to participate in 
industrial action, thus removing a central element in the trade union’s capacity to enforce 
social norms of solidarity in strike situations. Nor was it a permitted ground to exclude or 
expel on the basis of the individual’s membership or non-membership of another trade union. 
This excluded ground was targeted at the enforcement of the ‘Bridlington Principles’, 
administered by the TUC Disputes Committee, which were designed to regulate 
organisational competition between affiliated trade unions. Since membership of another 
trade union was not a permitted ground of exclusion or expulsion, the enforcement of the 
‘Bridlington Principles’ was impeded by s. 174. 
 
The article also displays a ‘law in context’ approach to the evaluation of critique of s. 174. It 
sets s. 174 in the wider context of Conservative reforms on the closed shop, union finances 
64 Ibid., 237 (emphasis added). 
65 Ibid., 250 (emphasis added). 
66 Ibid., 236. 
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and internal union democracy, such that the right could be regarded as ‘an integral part of this 
strand of policy which is clearly a potentially rich seam for the government to tap in pursuit 
of the now undisguised policy of ending collectivism in British labour relations.’67 It also 
considers the likely consequences of s. 174 in the light of trade union practices and the body 
of decisions generated by the TUC Disputes Committee. In this respect, the principal measure 
of collectivism in this context is in the social effects of the legislation. In some respects, 
Simpson’s predictions are remarkably prescient, for example in his concerns about ‘the 
possibility of “bounty hunters” actively seeking rejection of membership applications in 
pursuit of the £5,000 minimum compensation award.’68 The litigation in ASLEF v United 
Kingdom would provide a vindication of that prediction in the light of coordinated ‘bounty 
hunting’ by members of the British National Party.69  
 
Ultimately, Simpson’s concerns are focused upon s. 174 as a political tool for encouraging 
the fragmentation and further erosion of strong and coordinated collective bargaining 
practices: ‘The fundamental issue posed by section 14 is not the survival of Bridlington as 
such, but the ability of mainstream unions to function as a movement coordinating their 
activities rather than as separate competing units.’70 In this way, Simpson shared 
Wedderburn’s concern to limit the scope for individual dissentients to use rights-litigation to 
challenge existing union structures. There is little trace of Kahn-Freund’s earlier concern with 
‘the protection of the individual against superior social forces’ and the increased willingness 
of courts ‘to protect minorities inside trade unions’.71 This is not surprising. For Kahn-
Freund, the idea that the law might control union admissions was unthinkable in 1959. Yet s. 
174 achieved this in a single legislative stroke. Moreover, Kahn-Freund’s concern that the 
common law should protect the individual trade unionist had been animated by the growth in 
trade union power represented in strong closed-shop practices. By 1993, when Simpson was 
postulating the conflict between individualism and collectivism in such strong terms, the 
social and legal context had undergone a remarkable transformation. The closed shop was 
now effectively unenforceable, and trade unions were operating from a position of social, 
67 Simpson, n.55 at 183. 
68 Ibid., 189. 
69 [2007] ECHR 184. 
70 Simpson, n.55, at 193. 
71Kahn-Freund, n.22, at 36. 
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economic and political weakness. The individual right to choose not to strike, or to choose 
which union to join, represented the highpoint of British labour law’s ‘libertarian stance’.72 
 
3.  INDIVIDUALISM, COLLECTIVISM, AND THE RIGHT TO ORGANISE 
 
A. The UK model: strong individualism 
 
As Simpson has argued, the UK model of the ‘right to organize’ is based upon a strongly 
individualistic model. In fact, the structure of those individual rights is strongly ‘bipolar’ in 
its form, and resembles the basic structure of a private law right.73 This is because the right 
contemplates a single relation between an individual right-holder (the worker) and an 
individual wrongdoer (the employer), and the remedy aims to restore the position of the right-
holder by repairing the wrong. This is marked by ‘correlativity’, namely that ‘the liability of 
the defendant is always a liability to the plaintiff. Liability consists in a legal relationship 
between two parties each of whose position is intelligible only in light of the other’s.’74  
 
TULRCA 1992 posits rights for workers and employees not to be subjected to a detriment, 
dismissed or have offers made to them on a range of protected grounds including trade union 
membership, participation in trade union activities at an appropriate time, and use of union 
services. This structure is individualistic in three distinct ways. First, the right-holder is an 
individual worker or employee.75 The trade union is not a separate right-holder with legally 
protected interests, but can only benefit derivatively from individual enforcements. Second, 
the trade union does not have standing to enforce the individual’s statutory right not to be 
victimised. The claim must be brought by the individual worker or employee. Thirdly, the 
remedies are primarily focused on compensating the individual for her losses.76 Hence, the 
individual has a secondary right to reparation against the wrongdoer, aimed at correcting the 
wrong that consists in the infringement of her primary right (not to be dismissed because of 
trade union membership, or use of union services, and so forth). The union itself has no 
72 Simpson, n.55, at 192. 
73 E. Weinrib, Corrective Justice (Oxford: OUP, 2012), 2. 
74 Ibid., at 18. 
75 ‘Workers’ are protected from ‘detriment’ and ‘offers’ under TULRCA 1992, sections 
145A, 145B and 146. ‘Employees’ are protected from refusal of access to employment and 
dismissal under TULRCA 1992, ss 137 and 152. 
76 There is provision for a ‘special award’ in unfair dismissal cases: see TULRCA 1992, 
s.156. 
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remedy for its own collective losses associated with individual acts of anti-union 
victimisation and no right to bring a claim on behalf of a member.77 
 
A comparative perspective demonstrates how the ‘right to organize’ might incorporate 
elements of ‘individualism’ and ‘collectivism’ in the specific design of complex rights. It 
might be possible to introduce collective rights where trade unions themselves are 
independent right-holders under the legislation. Even where the right-holders are individuals, 
it might be possible to give the trade union standing to enforce the individual rights on behalf 
of the right-holders. It might also be possible to build in a collective dimension to the 
available remedies, for example to permit redress for trade union losses associated with 
individual rights-violations. The law on freedom of association in the US, Canada and 
Australia demonstrates a variety of ways in which these building blocks that compose more 
complex rights might be constructed. It is accordingly too reductive to talk in terms of a 
‘collective’ right to organize or an ‘individual’ right to organize, for this glosses over 
important distinctions in the internal architecture of complex rights. 
 
B. The US ‘unfair practice’ model: modified individualism 
 
The legal protection of freedom of association in the US is based upon an ‘unfair labor 
practice’ regime, the broad structure of which was introduced in sections 7 and 8 of the 
National Labor Relations Act 1935 (herein after the ‘Wagner Act’ named after its sponsor, 
Senator Robert Wagner). Section 7 specified the fundamental associative rights of employees 
in the following terms: ‘employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or 
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own 
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining 
or other mutual aid or protection’. These fundamental associative rights were protected by a 
set of ‘unfair labor practices’ that were enumerated in section 8. From the perspective of a 
‘right to organize’, there are two ‘unfair labor practices’ that are of particular importance. The 
first is the general provision in s 8 (a) (1) which makes it an ‘unfair labor practice’ for an 
employer ‘to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights 
guaranteed in section 7’. The second is the specific provision in s 8 (a) (2) which makes it 
unlawful ‘by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term of 
77 Although c.f. the ‘unfair practice’ provision under Schedule A1 statutory recognition ballot 
procedure, discussed in Bogg, n.1 at 78-81. 
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condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization’. 
These provisions are administered by an administrative agency, the National Labor Relations 
Board (NLRB), which adjudicates ‘unfair labor practice’ complaints and determines the 
remedies for violations under s. 8. 
 
We can adopt a three-level structural analysis of the US ‘right to organize’ which provides an 
interesting contrast with the pure individualism of the UK position. If we begin with the 
identity of the right-holder of the primary rights guaranteed by the legislation, s. 7 of the 
Wagner Act specifies the associative rights as individual rights of employees rather than 
collective rights of the trade union itself. In this basic respect, then, there is a broad similarity 
with individualistic approach in the UK legislation. The associative rights under s. 7 are in 
this sense individual rights. 
 
It is in respect of the secondary right to seek reparation for infringement of the primary right, 
however, that the distinctive character of the US regime becomes apparent. The legal 
procedure is initiated by the filing of an ‘unfair labor practice’ charge, and this charge may be 
filed by ‘any person, even a stranger to the dispute’ and so ‘need not be filed by the person 
actually aggrieved or adversely affected by the alleged misconduct’.78 As such, the standing 
rules for enforcement of ‘unfair labor practices’ are extraordinarily wide. It is for the regional 
directors of the Board, acting under the authority of the General Counsel, to determine 
whether an ‘unfair labor practice’ complaint should be issued against the party alleged to 
have breached the legal provisions. At this stage, the General Counsel ‘has plenary authority 
to determine whether an unfair labor practice complaint should be issued’.79 If the complaint 
is issued, the prosecutorial wing of the Board (consisting of lawyers for the General Counsel) 
will represent the charging party in proceedings before a separate adjudicative wing of the 
Board, although a charging party may also participate in those proceedings and be 
represented by its own lawyers.80  
 
78 R. Gorman and M. Finkin, Basic Text on Labor Law: Unionization and Collective 
Bargaining (St Paul MN: West Publishing, 2nd edition 2004), 10. 
79 W.B. Gould, A Primer on American Labor Law (Cambridge: MIT Press, 4th ed 2004), 60. 
80 Ibid., 61. 
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According to Godard, 31 percent of filings were made by individuals, compared with 69 
percent by trade unions.81 In this way, the enforcement of freedom of association rights under 
US law is both highly statist (reflected in the General Counsel’s pivotal role) and, in practice, 
highly collectivist (reflected in the de facto enforcement role of trade unions in ‘unfair labor 
practice’ proceedings). It reflects the distinctive historical origins of the US statutory 
structure, where the Wagner Act was ‘enacted in an era of swelling confidence in the 
administrative state’ hence ‘it contains no private right of action.’82 The decision to avoid 
private law enforcement perhaps also reflected ambivalence on the part of workers and trade 
unions about judicial involvement in the adjudication of labour relations disputes.83 
 
At the third level of remedies, the administrative character of ‘unfair labor practice’ 
proceedings has constrained the effectiveness of the remedial framework. As Estlund has 
explained: ‘The New Deal choice of administrative rather than judicial adjudication largely 
dictated the range of remedies: reinstatement, back pay, and other equitable remedies, but no 
compensatory or punitive damages of the sort that only juries could award.’84 There are two 
dimensions to this. The first is the inadequacy of remedies from an individual perspective. 
The Supreme Court has imposed sharp limits on individual remedies, the effect of which is 
that ‘a worker dismissed for union activities may be awarded only reinstatement with back 
pay covering lost income, defined as what the worker would have earned minus any earnings 
from other employment the worker may have obtained after dismissal’.85 Within the wider 
context of dilatory legal procedures and weak enforcement mechanisms in the US system, 
this translates into a culture of impunity for determined employers who are hostile to union 
organization and who treat union dismissals as a legitimate business cost of remaining union-
free.86 The second is the inadequacy of remedies from a collectivist perspective. In narrow 
circumstances, it is possible to obtain a ‘Gissel’ bargaining order where the trade union has 
demonstrated ‘majority support’ through authorisation cards and where employer unfair labor 
81 J. Godard, Trade Union Recognition: Statutory Unfair Labour Practice Regimes in the 
USA and Canada (London: DTI, 2004), 18. 
82 C. Estlund, Regoverning the Workplace: From Self-Regulation to Co-Regulation (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), 39. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid., 39. 
85 Godard, n.81 at 17. 
86 The classic work in this vein is P. Weiler, ‘Promises to Keep: Securing Workers’ Rights to 
Self-Organization under the NLRA’ (1983) 96 Harvard LR 1769. 
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practices tended to preclude the holding of a fair election.87 In theoretical terms, at least, this 
provides a measure of reparative intervention that corresponds to the trade union’s collective 
losses. In practice, however, ‘Gissel’ bargaining orders tend to be rarely issued and 
ineffective in practice.88  
 
In sum, the ‘right to organize’ in the US displays the following structural features: (i) it is 
individualist in respect of the identity of right-holders; (ii) it is both highly statist (in respect 
of the General Counsel’s discretionary ‘gatekeeping’ role) and collectivist (in respect of the 
factual prevalence of trade union complaints about unfair labour practices) in its approach to 
enforcement; (iii) it suffers from inadequate individual and collective provision at the 
remedial level. 
  
87 Gorman and Finkin, n.78, ch 6. 
88 Paul Weiler, Governing the Workplace: The Future of Labor and Employment Law 
(Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1990), 237. See also Godard, n. 81 at 17. 
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C. The Canadian ‘unfair practice’ model: complementarity between the individual 
and the collective 
 
Historically, Canadian labour relations legislation was based upon the US ‘Wagner Act’ 
structure, with legal recognition procedures based upon the principle of majority support in 
the allocation of bargaining rights.89 This necessitated a system of ‘unfair labour practices’ to 
restrain improper interference with workers’ freedom of choice to institute a regime of 
collective bargaining. There is a wider variation of constituent elements to this ‘model’, since 
labour relations are regulated at the provincial as well as federal level. The Ontario model of 
‘unfair labour practices’ provides a typical example of the Canadian statutory model. For the 
purposes of exposition, we shall focus on the Ontario structure of unfair labour practice 
provisions in its labour code in order to identify salient structural differences between the US 
and Canadian ‘right to organize’. 
 
Section 70 of the Ontario Labour Relations Act 1995 provides that ‘No employer or 
employers’ organization and no person acting on behalf of an employer or an employers’ 
organization shall participate in or interfere with the formation, selection or administration of 
a trade union or the representation of employees by a trade union or contribute financial or 
other support to a trade union’. This has been interpreted as positing an ‘institutional’ right 
for trade unions, rather than any ‘personal’ right of an individual employee.90 Section 72, by 
contrast, is concerned with the protection of employees’ rights. It provides inter alia that no 
employer ‘shall refuse to employ or to continue to employ a person, or discriminate against a 
person in regard to employment or any term or condition of employment because the person 
was or is a member of a trade union or was or is exercising any other rights under this Act’. 
This envisages a complementary structure of individual and collective rights, recognising the 
artificiality of separating out those elements in many disputes involving trade union 
victimisation.91 
 
89 Godard, n.81 at 8. 
90 James Mically Clock #2216 v. Board of Governors [1991] OLRB Rep. June 735. 
91 Canadian Paperworkers Union v. International Wallcoverings [1983] OLRB Rep. August 
1316. 
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With respect to the secondary right to seek reparation for the infringement of the primary 
rights protected under the legislation, individuals do not have standing to enforce the s. 70 
unfair labour practice provision. Since this is an ‘institutional’ right of trade unions, 
enforcement of that right is confined to trade unions rather than individual employees. While 
employees have standing to enforce their own rights under s.72, the trade union also has 
standing to pursue complaints on behalf of affected employees. In situations of anti-union 
victimisation against individual employees, in practice the trade union will usually seek 
enforcement of ‘institutional’ rights under s. 70 and ‘personal’ rights under s. 72. In this way, 
the Ontario legislation operates rules of standing that are both collective and individual. 
While individuals have no standing to enforce ‘institutional’ rights, the legislation recognises 
the vital role of trade unions performing an enforcement role on behalf of affected 
employees. This offers a pragmatic response to the practical difficulties of individuals being 
required to enforce their own ‘personal’ rights in situations of embittered employer hostility 
against unionisation. 
 
The complementarity of the collective and the individual, in respect of both primary and 
secondary rights under the Ontario legislation, is also reflected at the remedial level. There is 
much greater remedial flexibility to provide ‘make whole’ remedies for both individuals and 
trade unions whose rights are infringed.92 This includes orders of reinstatement and back pay 
for dismissed employees, including interim reinstatement. There are also a range of collective 
remedies where the trade union can demonstrate that it has suffered institutional harms. This 
might include an order for trade union access to the employer’s property; reimbursement of 
organizational and legal costs incurred by the trade union; or ordering the posting of notices 
by the employer setting out its infractions under the labour code. In serious cases, it is also 
possible for the Labour Board to order ‘remedial certification’ of the trade union as the 
bargaining representative, though such orders are exceptional and issued within the context of 
serious violations of the ‘unfair labour practice’ provisions.93 
 
The legal structure of the right to organize in the Ontarian jurisdiction in Canada displays the 
following features: (i) it combines individualist and collectivist elements in respect of right-
92 For a full discussion of the range of individual and collective remedies, see D. Doorey, The 
Law of Work (Toronto: Emond Publishers, 2017), ch 40.   
93 Doorey, ibid. See also D.D. Carter, G. England, B. Etherington, and G. Trudeau, Labour 
Law in Canada (The Hague: Kluwer, 5th edition 2002), 244-247. 
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holders, by positing ‘institutional’ and ‘personal’ rights; (ii) it has a relaxed approach to 
standing requirements, permitting trade unions to enforce ‘personal’ rights on behalf of 
affected individuals (though the converse does not hold since the ‘institutional’ rights of trade 
unions cannot be enforced by individuals); (iii) it combines individualist and collectivist 
elements at the remedial level, providing a range of possible remedies for the individual and 
collective harms that result from unfair practices. This demonstrates the scope for variation 
even within the broad parameters of a North American ‘Wagner Act’ model, with the 
Canadian conception of the ‘right to organize’ displaying complementarity between 
individual and collective elements across all three axes. 
 
D. The Australian system of ‘general protections’: complementarity between the 
individual and the collective 
 
In Australia, legal protection against anti-union victimisation is contained in Division 4 of 
Part 3-1 of the Fair Work Act 2009, and are known as the ‘General Protections’. Section 346 
of the Act provides that ‘A person must not take adverse action against another person 
because the other person: (a) is or is not, or was or was not, an officer or member of an 
industrial association; or (b) engages, or has at any time engaged or proposed to engage, in 
industrial activity…’ The concept of ‘adverse action’ is amplified in s. 342 (1) and includes 
situations where an employer ‘dismisses an employee, injures an employee in their 
employment, alters an employee’s position to their prejudice, or discriminates between an 
employee and other employees of the employer’.94 The category of ‘industrial activities’ 
protected in s. 346 (b) is similarly broad, although the legislation also protects negative 
freedom of association through its ‘General Protection’ guarantees.95  
 
In terms of the right-holder, s. 346 contemplates legal protection for ‘persons’. As Creighton 
points out, the Australian approach is in some respects much wider than the UK position in 
extending statutory protection beyond ‘employees’ to regulate the relations between 
94 A. Stewart, A. Forsyth, M. Irving, R. Johnstone and S. McCrystal, Creighton and Stewart’s 
Labour Law (Annandale: Federation Press, 6th ed 2016), [20.47]. 
95 B. Creighton, ‘Individualization and the Protection of Worker Voice in Australia’, in A. 
Bogg and T. Novitz (eds), Voices at Work (Oxford: OUP, 2014), 241. See also V. 
Lambropoulos and M. Wynn, ‘Unfair Labour Practices, Trade Union Victimisation and 
Voice: A Comparison of Australia and the United Kingdom’ (2013) 34 Adelaide University 
LR 43. 
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employers and independent contractors.96 Nevertheless, Creighton has emphasised that the 
‘General Protections’ in the Fair Work Act 2009 do ‘not expressly confer any protections (or 
positive rights) upon industrial associations as vehicles for the exercise of collective voice. 
Instead it provides protection against adverse action for individuals who engage in industrial 
activity, and permits associations to initiate enforcement proceedings on behalf of their 
members or potential members.’97 
 
In terms of standing to enforce the ‘personal’ rights in s. 346, the legislation makes provision 
for ‘collective’ enforcement of those rights. For example, in enforcing the dismissal 
provisions, s. 365 provides that either the dismissed individual or ‘an industrial association 
that is entitled to represent the industrial interests of the person’ may make an application to 
the Fair Work Commission alleging a breach of the ‘General Protections’ provisions. If the 
conciliation or arbitration of the dispute is not possible, the complainant may then seek a 
judicial remedy in the Federal Court.98 The standing rules therefore adopt a complementarity 
approach, permitting either individual or collective enforcement of the individual right. 
 
Finally, the remedies typically involve reinstatement or the payment of compensation that is 
not subject to a statutory cap.99 According to s 545 (2) (b), he compensatory award is 
calculated by reference to ‘loss that a person has suffered because of the contravention’. 
Creighton and Stewart highlight the breadth of this formulation, which extends to ‘damages 
for non-economic loss, such as shock, distress or humiliation, or damages for loss of an 
opportunity.’100 It may also be possible to seek an interim injunction to restrain the dismissal. 
The legislation also makes provision for the imposition of financial penalties. The maximum 
penalty for corporations is $54,000 and $10,800 for other persons.101 It is also possible for the 
court to issue a discretionary order to apportion some or even the entire financial penalty to 
the individual, the applicant industrial association or the Commonwealth.102 This enables 
some measure of satisfaction to be provided to trade unions that may be seriously affected by 
acts of individual victimization against trade unionists. 
96 Creighton, n.95 at 238. 
97 Ibid., 233. 
98 Stewart et al, n.94 at 687-688. 
99 Ibid., 688. 
100 Ibid., 689. 
101 Ibid., 688. 
102 Creighton, n.95 at 245. 
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The legal structure of the ‘right to organize’ as protected in the ‘General Protections’ in 
Australian law displays the following features: (i) it adopts an individualist approach to the 
right-holder, conferring the primary rights on persons. Compared with other jurisdictions, 
however, it takes an especially broad approach to protected individuals by including 
independent contractors within its scope; (ii) in terms of standing and enforcement, the 
Australian legislation may be described as adopting a complementarity model, in giving 
representative ‘industrial associations’ standing to enforce the ‘General Protections’. There is 
also a statist element in that an inspector can seek the imposition of a financial penalty 
against a party contravening the ‘General Protections’;103 (iii) while the remedies are 
predominantly focused upon individual redress, reflecting the character of the underlying 
primary rights, the imposition of financial penalties may provide a form of collective redress 
where the court apportions part of the financial penalty to an affected trade union. In this 
way, the remedial structure may also be characterized in terms of individual-collective 
complementarity.  
 
Creighton offers a cautious evaluation of the ‘General Protections’ in assessing their 
contribution to workplace ‘voice’.104 On the one hand, Creighton is concerned with the 
protection of negative freedom of association in the Fair Work Act 2009 scheme, and its 
effects in undermining collective voice mechanisms. On the other hand, he argues that the 
Australian conception of the ‘right to organize’ goes considerably beyond many other 
Commonwealth jurisdictions in terms of the personal scope of the rights, the permissive rules 
on standing to enforce those rights, and the availability of pecuniary penalties in the remedial 
armoury of the courts.105 These features were all conducive to an effective regulatory regime. 
The brief survey of the right to organize in the UK and the US supports Creighton’s 
favourable assessment. There are greater structural similarities between the Australian and 
the Canadian approach which, although based upon an ‘unfair labour practice’ model, is 
similarly infused with balanced protection of individual and collective interests in the rules 
on standing and enforcement, and in the provision of remedies. 
 
E. Individualism and Collectivism: A Useful Distinction? 
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid., 247-248. 
105 Ibid., 247. 
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To what extent is the distinction between ‘individualism’ and ‘collectivism’ a useful one in 
analysing and evaluating the implementation of a ‘right to organize’? A comparative 
perspective suggests that there are five aspects of the distinction that warrant particular 
emphasis. First, the characterisation of a legal strategy as ‘individualist’ or ‘collectivist’ 
requires greater specificity if that characterisation is to be useful or illuminating. Very often, 
the bare fact that a legal right is conferred on an individual right-holder is treated as 
dispositive of the ‘individualist’ categorisation. The effect of this is obscure to the variety of 
ways in which legal rights can blend ‘individual’ and ‘collective’ elements in a complex 
structure. The Australian law provides an excellent example of this, where ostensibly 
‘individual’ rights are supported by wide rules on standing to enforce those rights and 
supported by pecuniary penalties that have a collective dimension. There may be good 
reasons for permitting the trade union the right to pursue a victimisation claim on behalf of an 
individual worker, even where the individual is disinclined to pursue her claim on her own 
behalf. This is because the linkage between the individual and collective interest is usually 
strong in situations of anti-union victimisation, harm to the individual being simultaneously 
harm to the group itself.106  
 
Second, it would be profoundly mistaken to fail to take seriously the critical importance of 
individual protections to support collective purposes. The well-documented failings of the US 
system are significantly attributable to the paltry individual remedies and legal enforcement 
regime where employees are dismissed with effective impunity. In this vein, Estlund has 
posed the following question of US law: ‘What if labor law had kept up with the times and 
added a private right of action for anti-union discrimination that the law already condemns? 
We might have had a “common law” of anti-union discrimination, with cross-fertilization 
from other wrongful discharge doctrines.’107 In other words, a strongly enforced private right 
of action for anti-union discrimination, with effective remedies for victimised individuals, 
must be regarded as a necessary (but not sufficient) component of any collective rights 
strategy. This is also supported by the experience of UK law. During a statutory ballot 
process under the Schedule A1 recognition procedure, the Schedule makes provision for an 
106 It does not follow that a trade union should be permitted to waive or extinguish an 
individual claim against the wishes of the individual, where she has had her right infringed by 
the employer. This would constitute a serious failure of corrective justice in respect of the 
individual’s rights and their vindication. 
107 Estlund, n.82 at 40. 
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‘unfair practice’ jurisdiction.108 It envisages a collective right for trade unions or employers, 
and it confers no rights on individual workers. It also coupled with a collective remedy, 
which permits the Central Arbitration Committee to make an order that the offending party 
take action to mitigate the effects of the unfair practice. The ‘unfair practice’ provision is 
broad enough to encompass the victimisation in the Carrington case, through the broad 
category of ‘undue influence’, but it gives no legal redress to individual workers. The absence 
of any individual protections is unlikely to contribute to a recognition procedure that is 
adjudged a ‘collective’ success for trade unions, if individuals are too cowed to support the 
union’s recognition claim. 
 
Third, the relative strengths of the Canadian and Australian legal regimes, in comparison to 
the UK and US legal regimes, is attributable to the complementarity of collective and 
individual protection. In this way, it is unhelpful to pose the regulatory choice as lying 
between either an individual rights or a collective rights strategy. Rather, a successful legal 
regime combines elements of both within an overarching regulatory strategy, providing rights 
and redress for individual workers and trade unions. This is supported by philosophical work 
on the nature and justification of collective rights. For example, Dwight Newman has argued 
that freedom of religion provides a paradigmatic instance of interdependence between 
collective and individual interests.109 Religious groups must enjoy certain rights of non-
interference with their internal governance; otherwise individual rights to engage in religious 
practices will be deprived of the necessary social context for their full and effective 
realization. Freedom of association is a compelling candidate for this ‘complementary rights’ 
model.110 The individual right to associate would be deprived of the necessary social basis for 
its exercise without strong trade unions that provide an associational context for those 
individual choices. This interdependence of the individual and collective was also recognised 
by the European Court of Human Rights in Wilson v UK, where the Court concluded that the 
rights of individual trade union members and the independently grounded rights of the trade 
union had been violated by the employers’ practice of offering financial inducements to 
contract out of the collective agreement.111 The individual rights and group rights enjoyed a 
mutually supportive existence under the general right to freedom of association. 
108 TULRCA 1992, Schedule A1, para 27A(2). 
109 Newman, n.5 at 159-160. 
110 For discussion, see Bogg and Ewing, n.12, at 406-408. 
111 [2002] IRLR 568. 
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Fourth, the ‘individualism’ of juridical form may sometimes be less important in determining 
the social effects of legal rights than other regulatory choices that are ancillary to the 
structure or form of rights. As an example, let us consider the different evidential rules on 
establishing ‘anti-union animus’ in trade union victimisation cases. These procedural rules 
can be pivotal in determining the efficacy of legal protections. In Canada, for example, 
legislation or case law has established legal presumptions of improper motivation, requiring 
the employer ‘to tender credible evidence as to another motive.’112 There are also strong 
legislative provisions under the ‘General Protections’ in Australian law. In situations of 
multiple possible reasons for ‘adverse action’, s. 360 of the Fair Work Act 2009 provides that 
it is sufficient if one of those reasons was a prohibited reason under the statute. Further, s. 
361 of that Act provides for a legal presumption that ‘adverse action’ is for a prohibited 
reason unless the employer can prove otherwise. While this provision has been emasculated 
somewhat by judicial interpretation,113 it still provides a powerful statutory technique for 
mitigating the evidential difficulties faced by claimants in proving the discriminator’s reason 
for action. In the US, by contrast, s. 10(c) of the Wagner Act places the burden on the 
General Counsel to prove that the employer was motivated by a prohibited reason. These 
evidential difficulties are exacerbated by the employers’ protected free speech rights, which 
limit the evidence that may be adduced to support a finding of anti-union animus.114  
 
The UK position is more complex. In situations of anti-union ‘detriment’, the legal threshold 
is that the employer’s ‘sole or main purpose’ must be for a prohibited reason. The stringency 
of this standard is mitigated by TULRCA 1992, s. 148 (1) which provides that it is for the 
employer to show its ‘sole or main purpose’; though as Deakin and Morris have pointed out, 
it remains for the worker to prove that the motivating purpose was unlawful under the 
statute.115 In dismissal cases, the burden of proof probably lies on the employee in 
demonstrating the reason for dismissal where she would otherwise lack the requisite 
continuity of employment for a general unfair dismissal claim; but otherwise the burden is on 
the employer to demonstrate the reason for dismissal.116 These variations in the technical 
112 Carter et al, n.93 at 237. 
113 Barclay v Board of Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further Education (2012) 
248 CLR 500. 
114 Gorman and Finkin, n.78 at 159. 
115 See S. Deakin and G. Morris, Labour Law (Oxford: Hart, 6th ed. 2012), 835. 
116 Ibid., 820 
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rules on procedure and evidence, while critical to the effectiveness of anti-victimisation 
protections, are orthogonal to the ‘individualism’ of the right. Nevertheless, strong worker-
protective norms are likely to reflect the strength of the legal system’s commitment to 
autonomous trade unionism as an overarching policy goal. In this teleological sense, then, the 
detailed rules that condition the law’s effectiveness are often a function of the degree of 
general functional commitment to ‘collectivism’ in the legal regime. 
 
Fifth, there are unresolved questions about how ‘collectivism’ might manifest itself in 
specific legal provisions. Consider the following. Should the ‘right to organize’ be confined 
to protecting established ‘trade union’ activities or should it also extend to more informal 
associational activities between workers?117 US law protects ‘concerted activity’ which 
protects association between two or more workers.118 Australian law also adopts an 
expansive approach to concerted activity, so as ‘to encompass ad hoc groupings of employees 
or contractors, so long as they have the purpose of protecting or promoting the interests of 
their members.’119 By contrast, Canadian law focuses its protection more narrowly on trade 
union activities.120 UK law adopts a similarly restrictive approach. In Chant v Aquaboats Ltd, 
for example, an employee (who was a trade union member) organized a petition regarding 
workplace health and safety.121 Following his dismissal, the court concluded that there was 
an insufficient nexus between his individual actions and the trade union; rather, his activities 
were the unprotected activities of an individual trade unionist. Which of these approaches is 
most ‘collectivist’? It depends, of course, on the meaning that one ascribes to ‘collectivism’. 
On the one hand, the broad protection of all forms of concerted activity might create 
alternative workplace associations that compete with and undermine established trade unions. 
On the other hand, confining the right to organize to established trade unions provides a weak 
norm in the circumstances of precipitous trade union decline in the private sector. Treating 
‘collectivism’ as if it had a single uncontroversial meaning obscures these vital normative 
distinctions. 
 
117 For a discussion of this issue from a theoretical perspective, see A. Bogg and C. Estlund, 
‘Freedom of Association and the Right to Contest: Getting Back to Basics’ in Bogg and  
Novitz n.95, at 141. 
118 NLRA Sec. 7, 29 USC 157. 
119 Creighton, n.95 at 232, discussing s. 12 of the Fair Work Act 2009. 
120 D. Doorey, ‘Graduated Freedom of Association: Worker Voice beyond the Wagner 
Model’ (2012) 38 Queen’s Law Journal 515. 
121 [1978] 3 All ER 102. 
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Finally, the ‘individualist-collectivist’ perspective might be concerned with the social effects 
of legal norms on collective structures and practices. Where legal norms have demonstrable 
causal effects in supporting strong trade union organization, we might describe such rights as 
‘collectivist’ (in effect, even if not in form). Given Simpson’s deep commitment to ‘law in 
context’, this empirical sense of the ‘collectivist’ categorisation of legal norms is especially 
prominent in his work. This is obviously contingent on the specification of an appropriate 
metric of collectivism. Furthermore, if we are seriously interested in measuring the social 
effects of legal norms, it is important to develop and apply rigorous empirical methods that 
are appropriate to that task. At times, lawyers of a ‘collectivist’ persuasion have not done this, 
particularly in assessing the impact of human rights litigation on workplace practices. For 
example, Simpson recently described jurisprudence from the Supreme Court of Canada 
establishing constitutional rights to bargain collectively and to strike as ‘optimistic straws in 
the wind’, and that ‘scepticism as to the likelihood’ of ECtHR judgments having ‘any real 
impact’ remains ‘an eminently defensible stance.’122  
 
Measuring the impact of constitutional litigation on workplace practices is a worthy empirical 
project, but I know of no serious empirical studies to date. In the absence of such an 
empirical project, there is a danger that empirical speculation reflects underlying normative 
reservations about the judicial role or human rights discourse. Certainly, it is an advantage of 
constitutional litigation that it provides a political opportunity for workers and trade unions to 
prompt legislative changes by elected governments. This creates a ‘collective’ impact in 
prompting changes to regulatory environments that affect workers as a whole. This makes 
constitutional litigation qualitatively distinct from individual litigation under anti-
victimisation provisions. Wilson v UK is an excellent case in point. It is no small irony that 
the ECtHR developed the idea of a trade union right to redress which was very much in line 
with Simpson’s earlier ‘collective rights’ proposal in his ‘Freedom of Association and the 
Right to Organize’ piece. That this failed to translate into a statutory collective right for trade 
unions in s. 145B TULRCA 1992 represents a failure of politics, not a failure of European 
human rights law. The controversial and complex character of these causal assessments 
underlines the difficulties involved in developing an empirically robust ‘law in context’ 
research agenda in this area. 
 
122 B. Simpson, ‘Comment: Alan Bogg on Bill Wedderburn and Kahn-Freund, Freedom of 
Association, and the “Autonomy” of Labour Law’ (2015) 44 ILJ 352, 354-355. 
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4.  INDIVIDUALISM VERSUS COLLECTIVISM IN TRADE UNION 
AUTONOMY 
 
The strongest version of the ‘individualism’ critique is set out in Simpson’s analysis of s. 174 
TULRCA 1992. This statutory provision controversially protects an individual right to 
choose a trade union. According to Simpson, this forms part of a larger pattern of intrusive 
state regulation of internal trade union affairs, such as statutory balloting requirements and 
restrictions on trade union discipline of its members. This body of law constitutes a 
repudiation of ‘collectivism’ and a triumph of ‘individualism’, Simpson writes, seeming to 
suggest that the two ideals are locked in a zero-sum struggle for supremacy. A legitimate 
legal regime would accord primacy to trade union autonomy, and the collective right of the 
trade union to determine its own internal affairs. In my view, this presentation of a zero-sum 
conflict between ‘individualism’ and ‘collectivism’ is unhelpful, and it obscures more than it 
illuminates. There are three reasons that support dispensing with the analytical distinction, 
each of which I address at greater length below. First, an individual ‘right to exit’ the trade 
union provides a strong support for trade union autonomy and collective self-determination. 
As such, an individual right provides a foundation for collective autonomy, hence 
‘individualism’ and ‘collectivism’ stand in a mutually supportive relation. Second, 
‘individualism’ deflects attention away from the important normative differences between 
different types of individual right against the trade union. Some individual rights are more 
important than others, and deserve stronger protection where they conflict with collective 
decision-making. ‘Individualism’ is too undiscriminating a category. Third, many of the 
difficult regulatory questions in this area of the law require sensitive balancing between 
competing rights and interests. It is preferable to identify those competing rights and 
interests, and to develop arguments justifying the ascription of relative weight to these 
competing rights and interests, than to stack the deck in favour of a ‘collectivist’ solution. For 
example, where a trade union asserts a right to discriminate against black workers in its 
bargaining activities, it is not clear that ‘collectivism’ should prevail. 
 
First, the effective guarantee of an individual right of exit from the group provides an 
important safeguard against oppressive and unjust actions by the group against its individual 
members.123 Where individual exit is protected through the legal system, this weakens the 
123 On the normative functions of ‘exit’, see Newman, n.5 at 156-165. 
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arguments in favour of legal intervention to impose liberal democratic structures on internal 
decision-making inside groups such as trade unions. That is why, as Kahn-Freund’s work on 
the ‘individualist tradition’ recognised, the existence of strong closed shop arrangements 
provided a justification for legal intervention to protect the individual from arbitrary abuses 
of power. This justification was based in the absence of an individual’s right to exit the trade 
union. Stuart White has also acknowledged this within the context of closed shop 
arrangements: ‘Since union shop arrangements obviously have the effect of reducing the 
individual union member’s power to exit the union if he/she so desires, they may also reduce 
the individual’s power of “voice” within the union…The liberal state must substitute its own 
direct regulatory power for the indirect regulatory power of exit that the individual union 
member is no longer readily able to exercise.’124 The effective individual freedom to exit may 
even entail the liberal state’s toleration of associations that organise their internal affairs in 
illiberal or undemocratic ways.125 In this way, individual exit operates in support of 
‘collectivist’ values of trade union autonomy. 
 
Second, ‘individualism’ glosses over important normative distinctions between different 
types of individual right. Let us take the example of the individual’s refusal to participate in 
strike action following a lawful strike call by the trade union. Section 65 TULRCA 1992 
protects an individual’s right to refuse to participate in industrial action. The reasons for 
individual refusal are irrelevant to the existence of statutory protection: it is the individual’s 
choice that is protected. By contrast, the common law adopts a more nuanced approach to 
individual protection. In Esterman v NALGO, the court adopted an interpretation of the trade 
union’s disciplinary rules in the contract of membership that was sensitive to the member’s 
conscientious objection to the proposed strike action.126 On a bluntly ‘individualist’ 
approach, both approaches seem to be objectionable in subordinating the collective will to the 
individual’s refusal to obey the order. This would ignore important moral differences 
between the two scenarios, however. An ‘individualist’ approach that had the purpose and 
effect of disrupting collective action, through the provision of a free-riders’ charter, is 
certainly objectionable. An ‘individualist’ approach that is carefully tailored to a right of 
conscientious objection, and the importance of respecting decisions that lie at the very core of 
124 S. White, ‘Trade Unionism in a Liberal State’, in A. Gutmann (ed), Freedom of 
Association (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1998) 330, 349. 
125 A. Gutmann, ‘Freedom of Association: An Introductory Essay’, in A. Gutmann (ed), 
Freedom of Association (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1998) 3, 23. 
126 [1974] ICR 625. 
                                                          
37 
 
the person’s moral personality, is attractive and legitimate. For similar reasons, liberal 
defenders of the closed shop have qualified this defence through the provision of a 
‘conscientious objection’ opt-out from union security practices.127 
 
Finally, the simple dichotomy between ‘individualism’ and ‘collectivism’ is too categorical to 
be useful in balancing the ‘right to exclude’ against important competing interests. For 
example, racist membership exclusion practices constitute an affront to the dignity and 
economic opportunities of black workers.128 It is a situation where the right to exclude is, in 
Stuart White’s terminology, in conflict with the dignitarian rights and economic opportunities 
of workers excluded on invidious grounds. Unlike intimate or expressive associations, trade 
unions would find it difficult to justify the claim that racist exclusionary practices are central 
to the moral personalities of their members. Consequently, such membership practices would 
not be entitled to presumptive respect as exercises of liberty of conscience or expression. 
Upholding the individual rights of black workers may involve a triumph of ‘individualism’ 
over ‘collectivism’, but there is nothing to be regretted in that. The moral considerations 
would shift again if we were evaluating the trade union’s right to exclude members of far-
right political parties. Here we may be strongly inclined to uphold the union’s right to 
exclude. The trade union’s expressive and conscientious commitment to egalitarian politics 
mean that the right to exclude is especially weighty in this situation, whereas countervailing 
dignitarian considerations of BNP activists are not obviously engaged.129 To describe this as 
‘collectivist’ or ‘individualist’ is something of a distraction from the moral balancing exercise 
that is needed.130 
 
5.  CONCLUSION: THE NECESSITY OF INDIVIDUALISM IN COLLECTIVE 
LABOUR LAW 
 
I have argued in this paper that ‘individualism’ is an indispensable element in a humane and 
decent regime of collective labour rights. At the abstract level of normative foundations, the 
‘humanistic principle’, which identifies the good of individual human beings as the aspiration 
127 White, n.124, at 346-347. 
128 S. White, ‘Freedom of Association and the Right to Exclude’ (1997) 5 The Journal of 
Political Philosophy 373, at 384. 
129 See ASLEF v UK [2007] ECHR 184. 
130 See V. Mantouvalou, ‘Is There a Human Right Not to Be a Trade Union Member?’ in C. 
Fenwick and T. Novitz (eds), Human Rights at Work (Oxford: Hart, 2010), 439. 
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of associational activity, establishes a basic threshold of ethical acceptability for competing 
theories of labour rights. Any theory of labour rights that fails to meet this threshold does not 
deserve our moral allegiance. The same would be true of any human community, including 
trade unions and other forms of labour association, which fails in evincing equal concern for 
the good of its individual members. With respect to the ‘right to organize’, individual rights 
and remedies are indispensable components of an effective legal regime. It does not follow 
from this, however, that an effective legal regime could be implemented without any 
incorporation of collective elements. The most effective legal regimes create space for 
collective interests, through the protection of group rights, broad standing rules for rights-
enforcement, and comprehensive remedies. These regimes are neither ‘individualist’ nor 
‘collectivist’, but are instead based upon the complementarity of individual and collective 
rights and remedies. With respect to trade union autonomy and the union’s right to exclude, 
this must also be tempered by a more nuanced account of competing individual rights. In 
particular, not all individual rights have the same weight when balancing them against the 
trade union’s ‘collective’ right to set its own membership criteria. Some individual rights, 
such as the right to conscientious objection or the right not to be subjected to unjust 
discrimination, may sometimes override the trade union’s right to exclude. We need to get 
beyond the tribalism of ‘individualism’ and ‘collectivism’ as antithetical worldviews, and 
recognise the multiplicity of claims that are often elided when we fall into that reductive trap. 
The value of Bob Simpson’s work is that it provides an admirable foundation for a balanced 
assessment of the virtues and vices of individualism and collectivism in collective labour law. 
